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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTING THE USE OF
SOCIAL MEDIA: FLASH MOB PROTESTS WARRANT FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
*

Michael J. Fitzpatrick
I. INTRODUCTION

Flash mobs are a phenomenon that has recently gained
significant popularity among entertainers and activists alike.
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a flash mob is
comprised of “a group of people summoned (as by e-mail or text
message) to a designated location at a specified time to perform an
1
indicated action before dispersing.” As its definition suggests, flash
2
mobs are intrinsically linked to social media. This association is
primarily a result of flash mobbers’ reliance on text messaging and
other social-networking technology to both organize and rally
3
support for their particular cause or performance. Additionally,
social media technology plays an important role during the
4
commission of a flash mob. Social networks enable flash mobbers to
instantaneously communicate with one another, thereby empowering
participants to immediately change venue, or, in some instances,
5
evade authorities.
Generally, flash mobs are associated with amusing performance
acts that take place in highly public areas, such as train stations,
6
parks, or town squares. Such an association is understandable, as
*
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1
Flash Mob Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/flash%20mob (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
2
See id.
3
J. David Goodman, Debate Over Social Media Incitement as Flash Mobs Strike, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, available at http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/17
/debate-over-social-media-incitement-as-flash-mobs-strike/?scp=1&sq=Flash%20Mob
&st=cse.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Sheila Shayon, Flash Mob Trend Spawns A New Social Media Industry, Social Media,
BRANDCHANNEL.COM (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.brandchannel.com/home/post
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flash mobs were initially used almost exclusively for entertainment
purposes, with large groups of performers organizing spontaneous
choreographed dances, songs, and other performances in public
7
areas. In reality, however, flash mobs encompass a much broader
8
range of activities. Despite flash mobs’ innocuous beginnings, their
scope of use has evolved, as flash mobs are now utilized for more
9
substantial and substantive purposes. In fact, flash mobs have been
10
linked to acts of crime, violence, and public disorder. For example,
in 2011 alone, flash mobs were linked to a protest in San Francisco,
11
riots in both Philadelphia and London, and robberies in Maryland.
As flash mobs are increasingly utilized for more sinister
purposes, a debate has emerged regarding how flash mobs should be
regulated and whether such regulations unconstitutionally impinge
12
upon participants’ First Amendment rights.
Perhaps the most
controversial issue surrounding this debate concerns governmental
13
regulation of flash mobbers’ systematic usage of social media. On
the one hand, police forces and other governmental authorities
argue that violent flash mobs are a byproduct of flash mobbers’
pervasive use of “social media . . . like Twitter and Facebook and
14
instant messaging services . . . [as] organizing tools for mayhem.”
Because flash mob participants rely on social media to recruit,
/2011/08/23/Flash-Mob-Trend-Spawns-A-New-Social-Media-Industry.aspx.
7
See, e.g., ShareATT, AT&T Network TV Commercial—Flash Mob, YOUTUBE (May
9, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bd8ppk0UCx8 (showing a television
commercial of a planned flash mob dance at a train station. This clip also displays
flash mobs’ close relationship to social media, albeit in a humorous fashion);
CulturePub, Historic Flashmob in Antwerp Train Station, Do Re Mi, YOUTUBE (Nov. 16,
2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQLCZOG202k
(video
of
a
choreographed flash mob dance in an Antwerp train station); ImprovEverywhere,
Improv Everywhere: Frozen Grand Central, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwMj3PJDxuo&ob=av3e (showing a flash mob
performance where hundreds of people spontaneously froze in Grand Central
Station, New York City. This video also shows how flash mobs can disrupt station
activities); discoverireland, St Patrick’s Day Flashmob in Sydney by Tourism Ireland,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxEB48jY3F8
(depicting a choreographed flash mob dance in Central Station, Sydney, Australia).
8
Shayon, supra note 6.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Justin Silverman, BART Phone Blackout: Did the S.F. Transit Agency Violate Free
Speech Protections, SUFFOLK MEDIA LAW (Aug. 27, 2011), http://suffolkmedialaw.com
/2011/08/27/bart-phone-blackout-did-the-s-f-transit-agency-violate-free-speech
-protections/.
13
Goodman, supra note 3.
14
Id.
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support, and evade authorities, government officials maintain that
they can more easily suppress flash mobs by restricting mobbers’
15
access to social media. In contrast, proponents of flash mobs and
free speech activists believe that “social media doesn’t organize riots.
16
People organize riots.” Following this logic, violent flash mobs are
17
born out of violent people rather than social media. As a result,
activists argue that restricting a flash mob’s usage of social media
violates the First Amendment by censoring expressive speech in a
18
protected forum.
Possibly the most indicative manifestation of this debate
occurred on August 11, 2011, when the Bay Area Rapid Transit
(BART), which is the San Francisco public subway system authority,
completely shut down cell phone and wireless service (the “wireless
network”) to their train platforms to prevent a planned flash mob
19
protest. This particular flash mob protest was in response to the
BART Police Department’s (BART PD) July 3, 2011 shooting of
20
Charles Hill, a homeless train passenger. Hill’s death sparked a
massive public outcry against BART PD, with protestors vigorously
demanding that BART PD be reformed and/or disbanded due to its
21
violent track record. On July 11, 2011, protestors flooded BART’s
22
Civic Center Station to voice their outrage with the shooting. The
protest primarily took place on BART’s train platforms and resulted
23
Due to the
in substantial disturbances to BART’s train system.
protest’s spontaneity, principle organization, and perpetuation
through social media, it is characterized as a flash mob protest.
15

Id.
Id.
17
See id.
18
Silverman, supra note 12.
19
Patrik Jonsson, To Defuse ‘Flash’ Protest, BART Cuts Riders’ Cell Service. Is that
Legal?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com
/USA/Justice/2011/0812/To-defuse-flash-protest-BART-cuts-riders-cell-service.-Is
-that-legal.
20
Id.; see also Maria L. La Ganga & Lee Romney, Protest Closes 4 BART Stations,
Leaving Commuter Crowd Stranded, LA TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/15/local/la-me-bart-anonymous-protest
-20110816.
21
La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20. BART faced a similar public reaction
after a BART officer shot an unarmed passenger in 2009. Zusha Elinson & Shoshana
Walter, Latest BART Shooting Prompts New Discussion of Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/us/17bcbart.html.
22
Silverman, supra note 12.
23
Id. (reporting that the July 11 flash mob caused congestion on BART
platforms, several train delays, and the partial and complete shutdown of various
BART stations).
16
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One month later, BART officials learned of a similar flash mob
24
protest scheduled for August 11. To ensure passenger safety and
prevent similar disturbances to the July 11 protest, BART officials
25
preemptively disabled BART’s train platforms’ wireless networks.
Perhaps due to the integral role that social networking plays in
organizing and sustaining flash mob protests, no protest took place
26
on August 11. This unprecedented tactic in shutting down wireless
service provoked an enormous reaction from protestors and free
speech activists alike, who believed that the shutdown
unconstitutionally violated protestors’ First Amendment right to free
27
speech. Consequently, activists promised to continue to protest at
BART stations until BART decided to “back away from their policy of
28
cellphone [sic] censorship.”
This Comment will investigate the constitutionality of regulating
flash mob protests via social media restrictions. This analysis will
examine the relevant issues and law associated with such regulations
and will demonstrate how the law should be applied practically, using
the BART wireless network shutdown as a case study.
Part II will begin by exploring whether a flash mob can qualify as
expressive speech and thereby receive First Amendment protection.
This section will analyze both the communicative and noncommunicative elements of flash mobs, which are crucial to
determining whether a flash mob is within the purview of the First
Amendment. Additionally, Part II will investigate, and diffuse, the
allegation that a flash mob protest’s use of social media frequently
constitutes incitement, which is defined as unprotected speech that
29
advocates for, and is likely to produce, imminent lawless action.
Part III will conduct a forum analysis to determine (1) what forums
are implicated by flash mob protests, and (2) the appropriate level of
judicial scrutiny applied to such forums. This analysis is crucial, as
“[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and
30
at all times.”
Part IV will consider whether preemptive access
restrictions to social media networks constitute prior restraints on
expressive speech, which carry a “heavy presumption against [their]
24

Jonsson, supra note 19.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Zusha Elinson, After Cellphone Action, BART Faces Escalating Protests, U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/us/21bcbart
.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=BART&st=cse.
28
Id.
29
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
30
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985).
25
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31

constitutional validity.” In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court
held that if speech is to be punished, it may only be punished after
32
the speaker has spoken. Because prior restraints are among the
most heinous restrictions on speech, the governmental justification
33
for such a restraint must fulfill a very stringent three-part test.
Immediately following each part, this Comment will apply the
relevant issues and law to the BART situation. Ultimately, after
thoroughly analyzing all germane factors and circumstances, and
responding to all relevant counter-arguments, these portions will
demonstrate that social media regulations are subject to the highest
judicial scrutiny, and, as a result, BART’s wireless network shutdown
unconstitutionally censored protected speech.
Finally, Part V will synthesize each preceding part and conclude
that although the constitutionality of flash mob regulations must be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis, completely restricting a flash mob’s
use of social media technology generally results in a First
Amendment violation. In sum, this Comment will argue that
provided a flash mob protest intends to communicate a
constitutionally protected message that is likely to be understood,
courts should strike down preemptive wireless and social media
restrictions as unconstitutional.
II. WHEN DO FLASH MOB PROTESTS CONSTITUTE PROTECTED SPEECH?
In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court held that First
Amendment protections do not “end at the spoken or written
34
word.”
Consequently, expressive conduct may receive First
35
Amendment protections. Accordingly, flash mobs that are intended
to convey communicative expression meet the first criterion for
constitutional protection.
A. Expressive Conduct and the O’Brien Test
In United States v. O’Brien, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]e
cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the
36
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” As a result, even when
31

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
Id.
33
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976).
34
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
35
See id.
36
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); see generally James M.
McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1
32
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conduct expresses an idea or opinion, it does not automatically
37
receive the full protection of the First Amendment. Moreover, to
receive any First Amendment protection, the expressive conduct
38
must be “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication . . . .”
To determine whether conduct is sufficiently communicative, the
Supreme Court has asked whether “[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was
39
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”
Therefore, expressive conduct must be analyzed on a case-by-case
40
basis.
Using this rationale, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
the following conduct is sufficiently expressive and qualifies for First
Amendment protection: the wearing of black armbands to protest the
41
42
Vietnam War, sit-ins against segregation, and “picketing about a
43
wide variety of causes.”
In contrast to protected spoken and written speech, the
government has more freedom to restrict protected expressive
44
conduct. This speech receives less protection because expressive
conduct is usually comprised of both “speech and nonspeech”
45
elements.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that “when
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
(2008).
37
See id.
38
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409
(1974)).
39
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410).
40
This is an important consideration. Although one flash mob may be deemed
protected expressive conduct, this does not mean that all flash mobs are protected
expressive conduct. For example, a flash mob protesting for a particular cause will
more than likely be deemed communicative in nature. In contrast, a flash mob
robbery, where the participants spontaneously loot a store in an effort to steal and
evade police, certainly is not communicative in any way. Therefore, regardless of
what conclusions are drawn about the BART flash mob protest, such conclusions are
not indicative of how all flash mob protests should be treated.
41
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
42
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966).
43
See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (finding that “[t]here
is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and leafleting are expressing
activities involving ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment”); Amalgamated Food
Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (holding that
picketing, which carries both elements of speech and conduct, that is “carried on in
a location open generally to the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose
or manner of the picketing, protected by the First Amendment”).
44
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
45
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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regulating the nonspeech can justify incidental limitations on First
46
Amendment freedoms.” As a result, to restrict expressive conduct
the government must prove that: (1) its regulation is within the
government’s constitutional powers; (2) the regulation serves an
“important or substantial governmental interest”; (3) the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of a particular
idea or opinion; and (4) the regulation is not “greater than is
47
essential” to further such an interest. In Johnson, the Supreme Court
emphasized that a restriction or regulation may not “proscribe
48
particular conduct because it has expressive elements.”
The O’Brien case effectively illustrates how to apply this test. In
O’Brien, the Supreme Court held that a statute that punished the
defendant for destroying his draft card did not violate the First
Amendment because the statute merely condemned the
49
“noncommunicative aspect of [his] conduct.” The defendant, who
set his draft card on fire to display his anti-war sentiment, argued that
the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon his right to freely
50
express his opposition to the war and the draft. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, concluding that the government had a
substantial interest in preventing harm to “the smooth and efficient
functioning of the Selective Service System,” which required each
51
draftee to have and preserve their draft certificates. Thus, when the
defendant destroyed his certificate, he frustrated a substantial
52
governmental interest.
As a result, the defendant was held
accountable for the noncommunicative impact of his conduct—
frustrating the Selective Service System—rather than his display of
53
anti-war sentiment. Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that
the government had a “substantial interest in assuring the continuing
availability of issued Selective Service certificates,” and the challenged
statute narrowly protected this interest by only condemning the
54
noncommunicative elements of divergent conduct. In addition, the
46

Id.
Id. at 377 (“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”).
48
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (emphasis in original).
49
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381–82.
50
Id. at 381.
51
Id. at 382.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 381.
47
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Supreme Court held that the defendant frustrated the government’s
interest by burning his draft card, and that the statute only
55
incidentally limited the defendant’s expression.
In the context of flash mobs, the O’Brien test reveals an
important consideration: flash mobs must be considered on a case-bycase basis. For instance, a flash mob robbery, which entails numerous
people spontaneously looting a particular store or neighborhood,
56
certainly is not imbued with any communicative elements. Flash
mob protests, on the other hand, almost always intend to
communicate a message. Despite this, each flash mob protest must
be individually analyzed to ascertain whether the protest’s message is
likely to be understood, whether the government has a significant
interest in regulating the noncommunicative elements of the protest,
and whether the government furthers that interest in a fashion that
only incidentally limits the protesters’ expression.
B. Incitement
Many opponents to flash mobs argue that flash mobbers use
57
social media to incite imminent lawless action.
To explore this
issue, it is essential to understand that the right to free speech “is not
58
absolute at all times and under all circumstances.” In Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, the Supreme Court stated, “there are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
59
Constitutional problems.”
Among these unprotected classes of
60
61
62
63
speech are incitement, fighting words, libel, and obscenity.
Thus, by arguing that flash mob protests constitute incitement,
opponents of flash mobs are espousing the belief that flash mobs,
and their use of social media, may be freely restricted and regulated
55

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
Shayon, supra note 6.
57
Silverman, supra note 12.
58
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
59
Id. at 371–72.
60
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
61
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (ruling fighting words, or “those
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a
matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction,” may
be freely banned without “a demonstration of additional justifying circumstances”).
62
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (finding that printing a
libelous publication about a citizen, who is not a public official, is not protected by
the Constitution).
63
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (holding that patently offensive
sexual and excretory speech is not protected by the First Amendment).
56
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64

by governmental authorities.
The seminal case regarding incitement is Schenck v. United
65
States.
In Schenck, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the Espionage Act—a World War I statute that
proscribed speech that attempted to obstruct the wartime draft and
“cause insubordination in the military and naval forces of the United
66
States.” Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer were indicted under
the Espionage Act for printing and distributing a pamphlet that
advocated for enlisted men and drafted men to forsake their duty to
67
the United States Army.
Schenck and Baer argued that the
Espionage Act unconstitutionally violated the First Amendment
because the Act discriminatorily punished actions based on their
68
viewpoint.
The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, holding that “the
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
69
done.” As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that when words
create a clear and present danger to the public, those words are not
70
afforded constitutional protection.
Furthermore, the Supreme
Court stated in dicta that wartime speech is much more likely to
create a clear and present danger; therefore, such speech is not
71
afforded as much protection as speech during peacetime.
Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the Espionage Act
did not violate the First Amendment because speech intended to
disrupt military recruitment likely creates a clear and present danger
72
to military conscription.
Although the clear and present danger doctrine was
progressively weakened over time, it governed incitement for nearly
73
fifty years. In 1969, however, the Supreme Court abrogated the
74
clear and present danger test with the Brandenburg v. Ohio ruling. In
64

Silverman, supra note 12.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
66
Id. at 48–49.
67
Id. at 49, 51.
68
Id. at 51.
69
Id. at 52.
70
Id. (emphasis added).
71
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
72
Id. at 53.
73
See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957) (holding that mere
advocacy of a forcible overthrow of the government as an abstract principle does not
violate the clear and present danger test); see also Andrianna D. Kastanek, From Hit
Man to a Military Takeover of New York City: The Evolving Effects of Rice Paladin Enterprises
on Internet Censorship, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 386–94 (2004).
74
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444 (1969).
65
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Brandenburg, the Supreme Court considered whether the leader of
the Ku Klux Klan’s (KKK) First Amendment rights were
unconstitutionally infringed when he was convicted under the Ohio
75
Criminal Syndicalism statute.
This statute restricted speech that
advocated for “the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
76
accomplishing industrial or political reform.”
The KKK leader’s
conviction was based on his fanatical speech that lobbied for the KKK
to take “revengent” action against the government and for KKK
77
sympathizers to march upon Congress.
In addition, numerous
78
members of the audience held firearms and burned crosses.
Rather than apply the clear and present danger standard, the
Supreme Court adopted a new test, concluding that the
“constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and it is likely to incite or produce
79
such action.” Consequently, the Supreme Court introduced a much
80
stricter, two-pronged standard. Under the Brandenburg test, inciting
speech must advocate for lawless action that is (1) imminent and (2)
81
likely to occur. Applying this standard to the facts, the Supreme
Court found that the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act was
82
unconstitutional because the statute punished “mere advocacy.”
This standard draws a distinction between mere advocacy and
83
preparation.
In Noto v. United States, the Supreme Court
distinguished “preparing a group for violent action” from abstractly
84
teaching that violence is a moral propriety or necessity. As a result,
a speaker’s advocacy or encouragement of violent tactics does not
constitute imminent lawless action unless such advocacy can be
75

Id.
Id. at 444–45.
77
Id. at 445–47.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 447 (emphasis added); see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 452 (Black, J.,
concurring) (finding that the clear and present danger test should be abrogated
because it has been “manipulated to crush what [Justice] Brandeis called ‘[t]he
fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions through new legislation
and new institutions’ by argument and discourse even in times of war”) (quoting
Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 273 (1947) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
80
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 449.
83
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1960).
84
Id.
76

FITZPATRICK (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

3/28/2013 4:11 PM

COMMENT

809

considered preparation, which arises when it is reasonably certain
85
that lawless or violent action will occur. According to the Supreme
Court, “to rule otherwise would ignore the ‘profound national
commitment’ that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
86
robust, and wide-open.’”
Proper application of the Brandenburg doctrine requires an
understanding of the term “lawless action.” According to the Ninth
Circuit, “lawless action” under the Brandenburg doctrine is
87
distinguishable from “civil disobedience.” In White v. Lee, the Ninth
Circuit held that
“[i]mminent lawless action,” as used in Brandenburg, means
violence or physical disorder in the nature of a riot.
Peaceful speech, even speech that urges civil disobedience,
is fully protected by the First Amendment. Were this not
the case, the right of Americans to speak out peacefully on
issues and to petition their government would be sharply
88
circumscribed.
Although White draws a distinction between lawless action and
civil disobedience, the difference between “physical disorder in the
nature of a riot” and civil disobedience remains unclear. Black’s Law
Dictionary clarifies this ambiguity, defining civil disobedience as “a
deliberate but nonviolent act of lawbreaking to call attention to a
particular law or set of laws believed by the actor to be of
89
questionable legitimacy or morality.” Therefore, civil disobedience
does not qualify as lawless action merely because violations of law
90
occur. Rather, the crux of civil disobedience is the existence of a
91
nonviolent act that calls attention to some alleged immorality. In
contrast, Black’s defines the term riot—the nature of lawless action—
as “[a]n unlawful disturbance of the peace by an assemblage of three
or more persons acting with a common purpose in a violent or
tumultuous manner that threatens or terrorizes the public or an
92
Thus, the primary difference between civil
institution.”
disobedience and a riot is violence and tumultuousness rather than
85

Id.
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
87
White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000).
88
Id.
89
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 280 (9th ed. 2009); see also ARCHIBALD COX, JR. ET
AL., CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 169 (1968) (“Social protests
and even civil disobedience serve the law’s need for growth.”).
90
See id.
91
See id.
92
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1441 (9th ed. 2009).
86
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illegality.
As a result, under Brandenburg, “inciting speech” is speech that
(1) is directed toward producing imminent lawless—or riotous—
action that (2) is likely to produce such action. Thus, when applied
to a flash mob protest’s use of social media, the most important
inquiries are (1) what conduct or measures the speech is advocating
for, and (2) whether such actions constitute lawless action or civil
disobedience.
C. Application to BART
1. Did the Planned BART Flash Mob Protest Constitute
Expressive Speech?
To receive constitutional protection, the August 11 planned
flash mob protest must be “sufficiently imbued with elements of
93
As such, the planned protest must be a
communication . . . .”
94
vehicle for communicating a particular message. Additionally, it
must be likely that this message will be “understood by those who
95
viewed it.”
Applying these principles to BART, the BART flash mobbers
intended to use the flash mob as a vehicle for expressing their
96
opposition to BART PD’s violent reputation. In fact, the planned
protest was part of a massive movement known as “No Justice, No
BART,” which was organized to call the public’s attention to BART
97
PD’s heinous and violent actions. Therefore, the flash mob protest
was aimed at communicating a particularized message. Furthermore,
this message was likely to be understood by those who viewed it. This
is evident through the July 11 protest, which featured flash mobbers
wearing bloody T-shirts to convey BART PD’s violent track record,
numerous chants calling for the BART PD’s disbandment, and
countless signs opposing violence against BART passengers like
98
Charles Hill.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized
99
picketing as sufficiently expressive conduct. As a result, the planned
93

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
Id.
95
Id.
96
Vivian Ho, BART: Next time, ‘zero tolerance’ for disruptions, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., July 13, 2011, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a
/2011/07/13/BAP51K9JQR.DTL.
97
Id.
98
La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20.
99
See generally Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
94
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flash mob protest qualifies as expressive conduct that may receive
First Amendment protection.
Although the planned flash mob protest qualifies as protected
expressive conduct, the government may nevertheless be entitled to
100
restrict it.
To begin this examination, it is important to note that
101
the planned protest had both speech and nonspeech elements.
The speech elements encapsulated the protestors’ opposition to
BART PD. These elements were disseminated via the protestors
picketing on train platforms as well as their posts on social
networking forums like Facebook, Twitter, and even through text
102
The nonspeech elements, on the other
messaging and e-mail.
hand, included causing delays to the BART system, causing
temporary station closures, and, most importantly, endangering
103
BART passengers’ and employees’ safety.
Next, the BART protest must be applied to the O’Brien test to
determine whether it constitutes protected expressive speech. The
O’Brien test is comprised of four parts that consider whether: (1) the
government regulation “is within the constitutional power of the
Government”; (2) “it furthers an important or substantial
government interest”; (3) “the government interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression”; and (4) the incidental restriction
on “First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
104
furtherance of that interest.” If all four elements are satisfied then
the government may regulate the flash mob protest. BART’s actions
likely fail the first prong of the O’Brien test because the regulation
unconstitutionally restricts access to a traditional public forum—
105
BART’s wireless and social networks.
This point, however, will be
106
analyzed in greater detail in Part III.E.3 infra.
It is questionable whether BART satisfies the second prong of
the O’Brien test. While BART certainly has an important and
substantial governmental interest in preserving passenger safety, it is
arguable whether that interest is furthered by BART shutting down
100

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
Cf. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
102
See Flash Mob Definition, supra note 1 (as its definition suggests, flash mobs are
intrinsically linked to social media. Social media is crucial to flash mobs in that it
allows flash mobbers to organize and publicize their cause to enormous amounts of
people).
103
See Elinson, supra note 27; Silverman, supra note 12; Ho, supra note 96.
104
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381–82.
105
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799
(1985).
106
See infra Part III.E.3.
101
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the wireless network. According to BART, the wireless network
shutdown prevented congestion on the train platforms, thereby
107
preserving passenger and personnel safety. In addition, BART was
concerned that the flash mob would cause substantial train delays
108
and station closures.
As seen through the July 11 protest, these
concerns were legitimate, and BART had an important interest in
109
ensuring that they did not occur again.
Despite this, the wireless
network shutdown only marginally furthered that interest, if at all.
According to an August 20, 2011 letter from BART officials to
their passengers, BART dismantled wireless service because it
received the following information:
[Protestors] would be giving and receiving instructions to
coordinate their activities via cell phone after their arrival
on the train platforms at more than one station. Individuals
were instructed to text the location of police officers so that
the organizers would be aware of officer locations and
response times. The overall information about the planned
protest led BART to conclude that the planned action
constituted a serious and imminent threat to the safety of
110
BART passengers and personnel . . . .
As a result, the wireless shutdown would not be effective until after the
protest had already begun, i.e., after the BART patrons and
personnel were supposedly in danger. Notwithstanding, a court
would likely rule that the wireless network shutdown alone
adequately advanced the government’s interest in public safety.
Despite this, in addition to the wireless network shutdown, BART
assigned over 120 extra uniformed police officers and operations
111
personnel to their train stations in preparation of the flash mob.
Consequently, BART provided ample security to quickly and
efficiently suppress the planned flash mob without the wireless
network shutdown. Ultimately, the shutdown was a superfluous
restriction that was not needed to further the government’s interest
in public safety. As a result, the wireless network restriction is
vulnerable to the O’Brien test’s second prong.
BART easily satisfies the third prong of the O’Brien test as the
107

Letter from Bob Franklin, President, BART Bd. of Dirs., & Sherwood
Wakeman, Interim Gen. Manager, to BART Customers (Aug. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110820.aspx [hereinafter BART
Letter].
108
Id.
109
See Elinson, supra note 27; Ho, supra note 966.
110
See BART Letter, supra note 107.
111
Id.
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shutdown was entirely unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. If BART’s letter is accepted as true, its sole motivation for
the wireless shutdown was to preserve passenger and personnel
112
safety.
Consequently, BART implied that it would take similar
preemptive action against any planned protest that could potentially
113
endanger passenger or personnel safety regardless of its message.
Presumably, BART would have taken the same or similar actions if it
learned of a planned flash mob defending BART PD. As a result,
BART’s wireless shutdown was likely unrelated to the suppression of
free speech.
As to O’Brien’s fourth and final prong, BART likely cannot carry
its burden. To satisfy the last prong of the O’Brien test, an incidental
restriction on First Amendment freedoms may not be “greater than is
114
essential” to further the government’s interest.
In the instant
situation, the amount of expression BART censored via its wireless
network shutdown substantially outweighed BART’s interest in
furthering public safety. To illustrate, BART denied every individual
on its platforms access to BART’s wireless and social networks
regardless of whether the individual intended to participate in the
115
protest.
As a result, BART censored an enormous amount of
expression, as all individuals on the platform were prevented from
calling, texting, tweeting, posting, or communicating in any way with
people outside the platform areas. Furthermore, BART’s bolstered
116
security diluted the wireless network shutdown’s safety benefits.
Consequently, while the shutdown censored a massive amount of
expression, it only marginally furthered BART’s public safety interest.
Thus, the restriction had more than an incidental effect on protected
expression, thereby failing O’Brien’s final prong.
Ultimately, BART’s conduct does not have a very good chance of
passing the O’Brien test. Thus, the planned flash mob likely
constituted protected expressive conduct under the First
Amendment.
2. Can the Planned Protest be Characterized as
Incitement?
Under the Brandenburg test, the BART flash mob protest and,
more specifically, the protestors’ use of social media, did not
112
113
114
115
116

Id.
See id.
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
Id.

FITZPATRICK (DO NOT DELETE)

814

3/28/2013 4:11 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:799

constitute inciting speech. In BART’s August 20 letter to its
passengers, BART officials claimed that it had obtained information
that the protestors would be using their cell phones to coordinate the
117
protest once on BART’s train platforms. Moreover, BART believed
that such individuals were instructed to communicate the location of
police officers and their response times to perpetuate the
118
demonstration.
This information led BART to conclude that the
planned protest constituted a “serious and imminent threat to the
safety of BART passengers and personnel and the safe operation of
119
the BART system . . . .” This explanation, however, does not satisfy
the Brandenburg test because the protestors’ speech advocated for civil
disobedience rather than imminent lawless action.
The BART flash mobbers used social media, such as Facebook,
to organize and advocate for the August 11 planned protest at
120
BART’s train stations.
In fact, a group known as “No Justice, No
Bart” created a Facebook page to recruit and organize support for
121
Additionally, it is reasonable to
the August 11 flash mob protest.
assume that this advocacy was likely to result in a protest on August
11. Despite this, the message that the protestors disseminated and
the actions that they advocated for were neither directed at, nor likely
to produce, imminent lawless action as defined by the Brandenburg
doctrine and the Ninth Circuit.
First, BART protestors were advocating for the reform and/or
122
the disbandment of BART PD and not for imminent lawless action.
The protestors’ speech was directed at effecting change by calling the
public’s attention to BART PD’s questionable tactics and
123
unrestrained use of deadly force.
In response, BART would likely
argue that the protestors encouraged the use of illegal means to
accomplish this goal, thereby bringing the speech within the ambit of
lawless action. This argument, however, is without merit because, as
the Ninth Circuit held in White, illegality does not necessarily imply

117

Id.
Id.
119
Id.
120
Andrew Dalton, Group Demanding BART Police Be Disbanded Might Be Disbanded
by BART Police, SFIST.COM (July 11, 2011), http://sfist.com/2011/07/11/group
_demanding_bart_police_be_disb.php.
121
Id.
122
See id.; La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20.
123
See La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20 (reporting that protestors chanted,
“No justice, no peace! Disband the BART police!” in response to the BART police
shooting of Charles Hill).
118
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124

lawless action.
BART’s trepidations about the August 11 planned
125
protest were largely based on the previous July 11 flash mob protest.
Although the July 11 flash mob protest was extremely disruptive, the
126
protest itself did not rise to the level of tumultuous or violent.
In
fact, when asked about this protest, BART’s spokesman Linton
127
In addition, news
Johnson acknowledged, “[n]obody was hurt.”
reports indicated that the protestors employed nonviolent tactics
128
such as picketing, chanting, and blocking access to trains.
As a
result, although the protestors’ tactics can be appropriately
characterized as law-breaking, breaking the law—albeit in a peaceful
129
manner—is a key characteristic of civil disobedience.
Therefore,
the planned August 11 flash mob protest likely would have resulted in
civil disobedience as opposed to lawless action.
Ultimately, based on the previous flash mob protest, BART had
no reason to believe that the August 11 protest would become
tumultuous or violent. Consequently, the August 11 planned protest
was comparable to civil disobedience and was not likely to incite or
produce imminent lawless action as is required by the Brandenburg
Doctrine.
III. FORUM ANALYSIS
Although certain flash mob protests are considered protected
speech under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that
“[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and
130
at all times.”
As a result, to decide whether protected speech is
permissible, a court must determine the type of forum that the
131
speaker is attempting to access.
This determination establishes
whether “the Government’s interest in limiting the use of its property
to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use
132
the property for other purposes.” This evaluation is crucial because
the government is entitled to impose various limitations upon a
speaker when his or her speech occurs on particular types of

124

White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000); see also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 899.
125
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
126
See Ho, supra note 966.
127
Id.
128
See La Ganga & Romney, supra note 20.
129
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 899.
130
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985).
131
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
132
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
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133

property. To facilitate this analysis, the Supreme Court has divided
property into three distinct forums: (1) the traditional public forum;
(2) the government-designated public forum; and (3) the nonpublic
134
forum.
A. The Traditional Public Forum
Traditional public forums include streets, parks, and all other
types of property that “have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing
135
public questions.” As a result, the principal purpose of traditional
136
public forums is the free exchange of ideas. Due to this historical
commitment to free expression in traditional public forums, the
government may not exclude speakers from these forums unless the
exclusion serves a “compelling state interest and the exclusion is
137
narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”
Despite this stringent
standard, the government is entitled to enforce content-neutral time,
place, and manner regulations on speech, provided those regulations
are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
138
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”
In Arkansas Education Television Commission v. Forbes, the Supreme
Court clarified what property qualifies as a traditional public forum
by rejecting “the view that [the] traditional public forum status
139
extends beyond [a property’s] historical confines.” As a result, the
Court held that one must examine the history of a type of property to
140
determine whether it qualifies as a traditional public forum.
An
example of the Court’s application of the historical confines standard
133

Perry, 460 U.S. at 44; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799–800 (“Nothing in the
Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to
exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without
regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the
speaker’s activities.”).
134
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
135
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,
515 (1939)); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (ruling that “[t]raditional public fora
are those places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate”) (internal quotations omitted).
136
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
137
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
138
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
139
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998)
(finding that public forums are those places that by definition are “open for
expressive activity regardless of the government’s intent.” The Court also used the
phrase “unfettered access” in describing the nature of a traditional public forum).
140
Id.
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is seen in United States v. American Library Association, Inc., where the
Supreme Court considered whether the Internet constitutes a
141
In American Library, the plaintiff
traditional public forum.
challenged the constitutionality of implementing an Internet website
142
filter in a public library. Applying the historical confines standard,
the Court ruled that because Internet access did not exist until
recently, it had not “immemorially been held in trust for the use of
143
the public” for purposes of free expression.
As a result, Internet
access within a public library does not meet the historical confines
144
standard and is thereby not a traditional public forum.
Similar to American Library, in Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville,
the Sixth Circuit held that although certain aspects of the Internet
conform to the definition of a traditional public forum, it has not
“time out of mind, . . . [been] used for purposes of . . .
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
145
questions.”
Consequently, despite its conforming characteristics,
the Internet is not a public forum solely because of the historical
confines standard. As a result, the Internet illustrates the pitfalls
associated with a rigid historical confines standard.
B. The Government-Designated Public Forum
The second category of forums—the government-designated
public forum—consists of property that the government explicitly
146
opens to the public for expressive activity.
Similar to traditional
public forums, speakers may not be excluded from governmentdesignated public forums unless the exclusion is narrowly tailored to
147
serve a compelling governmental interest.
Furthermore,
government-designated public forums are afforded the same
protections regardless of whether the government voluntarily created

141

United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205–06 (2003).
Id.
143
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (concluding that “doctrines
surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to situations where such
history is lacking”).
144
Id.
145
Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (finding
that “[a]nyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of
communication and information retrieval methods” and such discourse may be
conducted with anyone in the world who has access to the Internet).
146
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
147
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
142
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the forum or was compelled to create the forum. Despite this, the
government is not obligated to indefinitely maintain the public
149
character of such forums.
A government-designated public forum is not formed by mere
150
inaction or by allowing “limited discourse” in a particular area.
“Only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
151
discourse” is a government-designated public forum created. Thus,
in contrast to a traditional public forum, which is automatically open
for public discourse regardless of governmental intent, a governmentdesignated forum is only created through a clear governmental intent
to open property for public discourse. Moreover, to ascertain
whether a governmental authority specifically opened property for
free expression, a court will look to the “policy and practice” of the
152
particular agency or body. In addition, courts will also look to the
nature of the property in question and its “compatibility with
153
expressive activity to discern the government’s intent.”
An example of a government-designated public forum is seen in
Widmar v. Vincent, where the Supreme Court held that a state
university created a public forum when it made certain campus
154
facilities available to registered student groups.
In Widmar, the
university unconstitutionally violated a student religious group’s First
Amendment rights by denying them access to the university’s facilities
155
based on their desire to engage in religious worship and discussion.
The Supreme Court held that the university’s policy of
accommodating registered student group meetings evidenced a
156
governmental intent to create a public forum.
As such, the
university was required to justify its exclusion of the religious group
by proving that the exclusion was narrowly tailored to serve a
157
compelling governmental interest.
Ultimately, the university was
148

Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (1983) (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
Id. at 46.
150
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802–03 (“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee
access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.”)
(quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’n., 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981)).
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. (holding that when “the nature of the property is inconsistent with
expressive activity,” a court is particularly reluctant to rule the government intended
to create a public forum).
154
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
155
Id. at 269.
156
Id. at 268.
157
Id. at 270.
149
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unable to produce a compelling justification to carry this heavy
158
burden.
In contrast, in American Library, the Supreme Court held that
Internet access in a public library is not a designated public forum
because a “public library does not acquire Internet terminals in order
to create a public forum for Web publishers to express
159
themselves . . . .”
Rather, libraries provide “Internet access, not to
‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,’ but for the
same reasons it offers other library resources: to facilitate research,
learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of
160
requisite and appropriate quality.”
Thus, because the Supreme
Court found that the library provided Internet access solely for
information gathering, the library did not intend to designate its
161
Internet access for expression.
American Library is an example of
the Court investigating the policy and practices of a governmental
agency to ascertain an intent to create a public forum. Ultimately,
absent clear evidence of a governmental intent to create a public
forum, courts will rule that a forum is nonpublic under the First
162
Amendment.
C. The Nonpublic Forum
When property does not qualify as a traditional public forum or
a government-designated public forum, the property is considered a
163
nonpublic forum.
Speech within nonpublic forums receives the
least amount of First Amendment protection and “[a]ccess . . . can be
restricted as long as the restrictions are ‘reasonable and [are] not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
164
the speaker’s view.’” In addition, an access restriction to nonpublic
forums “need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable
165
Furthermore, such restrictions
or the only reasonable limitation.”
may be based on “subject matter and speaker identity” so long as the
restriction is reasonable with respect to the character of the forum
166
and the restriction is viewpoint neutral. Thus, a speaker may not be
158

Id.
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003).
160
Id. at 206–07.
161
Id.
162
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985).
163
Id. at 800.
164
Id.
165
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992).
166
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 37 (1983)).
159
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excluded from a nonpublic forum merely because the government
disagrees with his or her viewpoint on a subject that is otherwise
167
appropriate within the forum.
Additionally, courts will look to the nature of the property in
168
question to determine if it is a nonpublic forum.
Where “the
nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity,” a court
is particularly reluctant to rule that the government intended to
169
create a public forum. This rule is consistent with the idea that the
government, like private property owners, has the right to “preserve
the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
170
dedicated.”
Despite this, even when property is characterized as
nonpublic it “can still serve as a forum for First Amendment
expression if the expression is appropriate for the property . . . and is
not incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
171
particular time.” This rule implies that excluding expressive activity
that is consistent with the nature and activity of a forum is
unreasonable.
172
One example of a nonpublic forum is an airport terminal. In
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, the Supreme
Court held that airport terminals do not constitute public forums
because: (1) “the tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate
that airports have historically been made available for speech
activity,” and (2) airports have not been “intentionally opened by
173
their operators” for speech activity.
Furthermore, the distribution
of religious materials in airplane terminals, which was the challenged
speech activity in Krishna, was inconsistent with the nature of the
property as such distributions were likely to disrupt business by

167

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (“Although a speaker may be excluded from a
nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose
of the forum, or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial
benefit the forum was created, the government violates the First Amendment when it
denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an
otherwise includible subject.”).
168
Id.
169
Id. at 803.
170
Krishna, 505 U.S. at 679–80.
171
Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767,
773 (2d Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted) (holding that although a Mass
Transit Authority station is a nonpublic forum, selling newspapers through news
racks is consistent with the normal activity of the forum and thus it is unreasonable to
completely exclude them).
172
See Krishna, 505 U.S. at 681.
173
Id. at 680–81.
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causing passengers an unwanted inconvenience.
As a result, the
Supreme Court concluded that the terminals were nonpublic forums,
and the challenged access restrictions were subject to a
175
reasonableness test. Applying this reasonableness test, the Supreme
Court held that because solicitation has a disruptive effect on airport
activities and causes unwanted passenger inconvenience, excluding
176
solicitation from the forum was reasonable, and thus constitutional.
In essence, the nonpublic forum operates as a catchall forum
because all types of property that do not qualify as traditional public
forums or government-designated public forums necessarily fall into
this category.
D. Beginning the Forum Analysis
To conduct a forum analysis, the most logical starting point is
determining the forum’s classification. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a
177
forum does not have to be tangible property.
Rather, a forum is
“defined in terms of the access sought by the speaker,” and, as a
result, a “particular channel of communication [can] constitute[] [a]
178
forum for First Amendment purposes.”
Moreover, the Supreme
Court held that there are two types of access that speakers can seek:
179
general access or limited access. A speaker seeks general access to
public property when he or she attempts to utilize the entire property
180
for speech purposes. As a result, the forum encompasses the entire
181
property. In contrast, “[i]n cases in which limited access is sought,
[the Supreme Court has] taken a more tailored approach to
ascertaining the perimeters of a forum within the confines of the
182
government property.”
For example, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’
Association, the speaker attempted to gain access to a public school’s
183
The Supreme
internal mail system and the teachers’ mailboxes.
174

Id. at 683.
Id.
176
Id. at 684–85.
177
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985).
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id. (internal citations omitted).
183
See generally Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983) (holding that the internal mail system was the relevant forum
notwithstanding the fact that an internal mail system lacks physicality).
175
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Court held that despite its intangible nature, the internal mailing
184
This is an
system, rather than the school, was the relevant forum.
185
Comparably, in
instance where a speaker sought limited access.
Cornelius, the Supreme Court ruled that the Combined Federal
Campaign (CFC), which was a charity drive aimed at federal
employees, was the relevant forum despite the CFC’s designation as
186
“a particular means of communication.” Similar to Perry, the Court
took a more tailored, limited-access approach to identifying the CFC
187
as the relevant forum.
Therefore, a court identifies a forum by determining where a
188
speaker is attempting to gain access.
In addition, it is
inconsequential whether the speaker is attempting to gain access to
189
something that is tangible or intangible.
Finally, the scope of the
forum ultimately depends on whether the speaker is attempting to
190
gain general or limited access to the property.
As a general rule,
however, where a speaker attempts to access a means of
communication, such as a social network, a court should employ a
191
limited-access approach to identifying the forum.
E. Application to BART
1. Identifying the Forum(s)
With respect to the August 11 planned protest, it is clear that the
flash mobbers were attempting to gain access to BART’s train
192
platforms.
This can be inferred by examining the July 11 protest,
which used BART’s train platforms as the primary location for the

184

Id. (holding that the internal mail system was a nonpublic forum because the
mailing system was only intended for use by the school’s faculty and staff. Thus, the
plaintiffs were not among the group for whose special benefit the forum was
created).
185
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985).
186
Id. (finding that the CFC was a nonpublic forum because it did not meet the
criteria for a traditional public forum or a government-designated public forum.
The Supreme Court ruled that neither the history nor the nature of the CFC
supported respondents’ contention that the CFC was a government-designated
public forum); see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003)
(holding that Internet access in a public library is a nonpublic forum despite the
Internet’s intangibleness).
187
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
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193

demonstration.
While the train platforms were an obvious forum,
BART flash mobbers also attempted to gain access to a particular
channel of communication: BART’s wireless network and, more
specifically, the social media networks that it enables.
As is evident by its definition, flash mobs are intrinsically linked
194
with social media.
Thus, the success of a flash mob protest is
contingent upon how well flash mobbers can utilize social media to
organize and disseminate information to additional supporters.
Consequently, BART protestors likely relied on having the ability to
access BART’s wireless network during the planned protest.
Although the wireless network is not tangible property like a park or
a sidewalk, the Supreme Court has held that a means of
195
communication can be a forum for First Amendment purposes. As
a result, the BART situation is comparable to Cornelius and Perry,
where the relevant forums were also intangible means of
196
communication.
As such, BART’s wireless network qualifies as a
197
forum.
Once the forums are identified, a court must determine what
198
type of access is sought: general or limited.
BART would likely
argue that the protestors sought general access to the property, and
therefore, the forum encompassed BART’s train stations as a whole.
This argument, however, is unjustified as the July 11 protest merely
199
took place on BART’s train platforms.
According to the Supreme
Court, when a speaker seeks such limited access a court may take a
more tailored, piecemeal approach to determining the appropriate
200
forum. In contrast, when a speaker attempts to access a property in
201
its entirety, the forum encompasses the whole property.
Additionally, courts generally take a tailored, limited access approach
when a means of communication—such as BART’s wireless
202
network—is implicated. In the instant matter, the BART protestors
193

See Silverman, supra note 12.
Flash Mob Definition, supra note 1 (a flash mob is comprised of “a group of
people summoned (as by e-mail or text message) to a designated location at a specified
time to perform an indicated action before dispersing”) (emphasis added).
195
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985).
196
Id.; Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 37 (1983);
see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (examining whether
the Internet is a public or nonpublic forum).
197
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
198
Id.
199
See BART Letter, supra note 1077; Silverman, supra note 12.
200
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 801–02; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460
194
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merely attempted to access a specific location and wireless network
203
Consequently, the access sought was
within BART’s train stations.
limited, and a court should take a tailored approach to determining
the scope of the forum.
Using a tailored approach, a court would certainly find that
BART’s platform areas constitute a forum. As for the second possible
forum—BART’s wireless network—free speech activists may be able
to argue that under a limited access approach, this analysis must be
tailored even further. During flash mobs, protestors only seek access
to social media networks, such as instant messaging, Twitter, and
Facebook, to disseminate information, communicate with one
204
another, and recruit new supporters. Consequently, flash mobbers
do not attempt to utilize most of the other functions and capabilities
that wireless networks offer. Thus, it is reasonable for flash mobbers
to contend that the relevant forum is the social media networks
within BART’s wireless network, rather than BART’s wireless network
as a whole. Although this is a logical argument, a court may dismiss it
for being overly narrow. In sum, there are likely two forums in this
particular situation: (1) BART’s train platforms and (2) BART’s
wireless network and/or the social media networks that it enables.
2. BART’s Train Platforms are Nonpublic Forums
BART’s train platforms are likely nonpublic forums and, as a
result, restrictions on speech in these areas are subject to a
reasonableness test. First, BART’s train platforms are not traditional
public forums because the platforms’ principal purpose is to provide
for convenient and cheap public transportation rather than the free
205
exchange of ideas.
Moreover, BART’s train platforms are comparable to the forums
in both Gannett v. Metropolitan Transport Authority and Krishna. In
Gannett, the Second Circuit ruled that the New York Mass Transit
Authority (MTA) subway platforms were not traditional public
forums because they were not primarily “used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing
206
public questions.”
Similarly, in Krishna, the Supreme Court held
that airplane terminals are not traditional public forums because they

U.S. 37 at 44 (1983).
203
See BART Letter, supra note 1077; Silverman, supra note 12.
204
Goodman, supra note 3; see also Flash Mob Definition, supra note 1.
205
Gannett v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d. 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1984).
206
Id. at 772 (internal quotations omitted).
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are not traditionally made available for speech activity.
Thus,
because BART’s train platforms are analogous to both the MTA
platforms in Gannett and the airport terminal in Krishna, BART’s train
platforms would likely be denied traditional public forum status.
In addition, there is no evidence that BART officials opened or
designed their platforms for expression or discourse, which is
208
required to establish a government-designated public forum.
This
is evident in BART’s explicit rules governing the time, place, and
manner of expressive activities in their stations:
For more than 25 years, BART has had a policy regarding
the exercise of First Amendment free speech rights in areas
of its stations where it can be done safely and without
interference with BART’s primary mission of providing safe,
efficient and reliable public transportation services. To
implement this policy, BART has designated the areas of its
stations that are accessible to the general public without the
purchase of tickets as unpaid areas that are open for
expressive activity upon issuance of a permit subject to
BART’s rules. To protect public safety and provide safe and
efficient public transportation, BART has restricted access
to the “Paid” and “Platform” areas of its stations to BART
station employees and ticketed passengers who are
209
boarding, exiting or waiting for BART trains.
Thus, BART did not intentionally open its paid and platform areas
for free expression.
Furthermore, the character and nature of BART’s train
210
platforms is not conducive to expressive activity.
BART’s train
platforms are intended for fast and convenient public
211
transportation.
Such objectives require that the platforms remain
uncluttered and easily navigable so as to enable passengers to easily
212
board and exit trains. As a result, allowing expressive activity—such
as a flash mob protest—in these areas will likely frustrate BART’s
purpose by creating platform congestion and unwanted
213
inconveniences for BART passengers.
Moreover, congested train
platforms expose BART passengers and personnel to certain safety

207
208
209
210
211
212
213

Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992).
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
Gannett, 745 F.2d. at 773.
Id.; see also BART Letter, supra note 1077.
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
Id.
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214

risks. Consequently, as the Supreme Court held in Cornelius, where
“the nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity,”
the Court is particularly reluctant to rule that the government
215
intended to create a public forum.
Accordingly, BART’s train
platforms do not constitute government-designated public forums.
Thus, the platforms fall into the catchall category: nonpublic
forums. As a result, any speech exclusion that BART places on its
216
platforms is subject to a reasonableness test. Under the particular
circumstances that BART was presented with, the shutdown of the
wireless network, which was meant to disrupt the effectiveness of the
planned flash mob protest, probably was reasonable as to the train
217
platform forum.
BART officials were concerned that the planned August 11 flash
218
mob protest would have detrimentally affected its commuters.
Using the July 11 flash mob protest as their guidepost, BART officials
believed that the planned protest would result in partial and
complete station closures, significant train delays, and the blocking of
219
commuter access to trains.
Comparable to Krishna, where the
Supreme Court ruled that it was reasonable for airport officials to
exclude solicitors from its terminals due to the unwanted
inconvenience that solicitors created, BART officials were reasonable
220
in attempting to minimize inconveniences on their train platforms.
221
In addition, this case is distinguishable from Gannett.
Unlike the
solicitation of newspapers on train platforms, which is considered
consistent with the normal activity of that forum, a flash mob protest
is inconsistent with the intended purpose of a train platform: the fast
222
and efficient transportation of passengers.
Therefore, because
BART’s restriction was intended to facilitate the suppression of the
planned flash mob, which was inconsistent with the nature of its train
platforms, the wireless network shutdown was a reasonable tactic.
Although shutting down wireless service is not the only
alternative or even the most reasonable alternative to ensuring
passenger and personnel safety, the Supreme Court does not require
214

Id.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803–04
(1985).
216
Id. at 800.
217
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992).
218
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
219
Id.
220
Krishna, 505 U.S. at 679–80.
221
Gannett v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1984).
222
Id.
215
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223

as much.
Under the reasonableness standard for nonpublic
forums, a restriction “need only be reasonable; it need not be the
224
most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.”
Additionally,
225
the exclusions must be viewpoint-neutral.
In this situation,
passenger and personnel safety and convenience motivated BART’s
226
wireless shutdown.
As a result, the exclusion was not based upon
censoring the flash mob protestors’ viewpoint. Ultimately, BART’s
wireless shutdown was a reasonable limitation on flash mobbers’
access to their train platforms, thereby making the restriction
constitutional in this context.
3. Wireless and Social Media Networks are Traditional
Public Forums
In contrast to BART’s train platforms, BART’s wireless network
and the social media networks that it enables are traditional public
forums for First Amendment purposes. The most notable counterargument against this categorization is that wireless technology,
including Internet access and cell phone service, is a relatively recent
227
development.
As a result, BART would argue that wireless
technology is not sufficiently entrenched in history to be considered
228
a traditional public forum.
To begin, the historical confines standard should be overturned.
Although it is questionable whether BART’s wireless network passes
the historical confines standard, it is important to note that the
standard is extremely unworkable and should not be treated as
dispositive. Since the creation of the historical confines standard in
Forbes, the Supreme Court has applied the standard rigidly,
maintaining that traditional public forum status will not be extended
229
to those forums where such history is lacking.
Recent
developments in technology such as mobile social media networks,
however, have exposed the need to abrogate this rigid and untenable

223

Krishna, 505 U.S. at 683.
Id.
225
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 37 (1983)).
226
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
227
See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998)
(rejecting “the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic
confines”).
228
Id.
229
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205–06 (concluding that
“doctrines surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to situations
where such history is lacking”).
224
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historical confines standard. First, the historical confines standard is
unworkable because no case law has addressed when a forum has
been around long enough to be considered “immemorially . . . held
in trust for the use of the public . . . for purposes of assembly,
communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public
230
questions.” Consequently, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to determine when or how a forum satisfies this test. Thus, the
indefiniteness of the historical confines standard effectively creates
an exclusive and unchanging category of traditional public forums—
231
public streets and parks.
Additionally, the shortcomings of the historical confines
standard are exposed when applied to forums such as interactive
social media networks. Social media networks such as Facebook,
Twitter, interactive Wikis, blogs, and instant messaging are almost
entirely devoted to “communicating thought between citizens,”
“discussing public questions,” and free expression in general, which
232
are the primary purposes of traditional public forums. These social
media networks foster an essential principle of the First Amendment
as they strengthen public discourse by creating a generally accessible
forum for individuals from different backgrounds and geographic
locations to exchange their thoughts, opinions, and ideologies.
Furthermore, with the development of 3G and 4G wireless data
technology, which enables Internet access and social networking
almost anywhere, individuals can perpetually access this forum and
233
take part in an ongoing dialogue.
In Putnam, the Sixth Circuit
acknowledged these benefits, finding that “[a]spects of cyberspace
234
may, in fact, fit into the public forum category.”
Over the eleven
years since the Putnam decision, cyberspace has advanced to the point
where these aspects have increased exponentially.
The benefits to free speech that social networking technology
engenders are not diminished merely because the technology was
recently developed. It is nearly impossible to rationalize why social
networking technology should not be considered a public forum
when it squarely fits into the Supreme Court’s definition of a
traditional public forum: “traditional public fora are open for
230

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)
(quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
What is 4G?, ATT.COM, http://www.att.com/esupport/article.jsp?sid
=KB115943#fbid=fx5pT69BE9H (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
234
Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2000).
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expressive activity regardless of the government’s intent.” Thus, the
rapid development of social networks exposes the arbitrariness of the
historical confines standard. Ultimately, the historical confines
standard frustrates the central function of the forum analysis—to
ensure that constitutionally protected speech within forums devoted
236
As a result,
to public discourse is adequately protected.
technological innovations in communication and expression like
social networking are not adequately protected under the current
237
interpretation of the law.
Regardless of whether a court chooses to treat the historical
confines standard as dispositive, there is a possibility that BART’s
wireless network would be considered a traditional public forum
nonetheless. It has been nearly a decade since the Supreme Court
last considered whether the Internet constitutes a traditional public
238
forum.
Over this time, the Internet has played an increasingly
239
important role in free expression and public discourse.
Furthermore, the Internet was first created in 1969 and became
240
widely used for personal telecommunication by the mid-1990s.
Thus, the Internet has now been in existence for over forty years and
241
has been used for discourse and expression for nearly twenty years.
As a result, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the Internet now
has a sufficiently long history and association with free expression to
satisfy the historical confines standard.
Provided the wireless network is found to be a traditional public
forum, the next step is to determine whether BART’s wireless
242
shutdown was sufficiently justified.
Usually, a restriction on
traditional public forums must “serve a compelling state interest
243
If the
[that] . . . is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”
restriction is content-neutral and only regulates the time, place, and
manner of the expression, however, the appropriate inquiry is

235

Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998).
Perry, 460 U.S. at 44.
237
See generally Stacey D. Schesser, A New Domain for Public Speech: Opening Public
Spaces Online, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1791 (2006).
238
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
239
See generally William Fisher, Freedom of Expression on the Internet, THE BERKMAN
CTR.
FOR
INTERNET
&
SOC’Y
AT
HARV.
U.
(June
14,
2001),
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ilaw/Speech/.
240
West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, Internet, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2005),
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/the_Internet.aspx.
241
Id.
242
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
243
Id.
236
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whether the restriction was “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and [left] open ample alternative channels of
244
communication.”
To determine if a restriction is content-neutral, “the principal
inquiry . . . in speech cases . . . is whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
245
message it conveys.” Under this test, “[t]he government’s purpose
is the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it
has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
246
others.” Thus, a restriction is content-based when something points
“decisively to a motivation based on the subject matter, or content, of
247
the speaker’s message.”
For example, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court
held that a city’s “sound-amplification guideline” was not targeted at
248
the message or content of an anti-racism concert.
Rather, the
regulation was justified because the city merely wanted to control
249
noise levels and maintain the tranquil character of the city.
The
Supreme Court concluded that this justification was entirely
unrelated to the content of the concert, and, as a result, was a
250
content-neutral restriction.
Applying this to BART’s restriction, the wireless network
shutdown was likely content-neutral. BART’s principal motivation for
shutting down service was to facilitate its security force’s ability to
suppress the planned flash mob to ensure the convenience and safety
251
of BART passengers.
As a result, BART’s restriction was “justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech” because
there are no indications that BART was attempting to censor the flash
252
mobbers’ message.
Presumably, BART would have employed
similar tactics had they been notified of a comparable protest
253
expressing the opposite view.
Moreover, the wireless network
244

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
246
Id. at 791–92 (holding that the “[g]overnment regulation of expressive activity
is content neutral so long as it is justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech”) (internal quotations omitted).
247
United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2010).
248
Ward, 491 U.S. at 792.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 803.
251
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
252
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791–92.
253
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
245
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shutdown constitutes a time, place, and manner restriction because
BART only shutdown wireless service to its train platforms for a
254
For instance, in many other areas of
temporary period of time.
BART’s train stations, such as “the street level and at all aboveground . . . stations and trackways,” wireless service was fully
255
available.
Therefore, the wireless shutdown was likely a contentneutral time, place, and manner restriction on expression.
To justify a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction,
the restriction must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
256
communication.”
BART’s interest in disabling its wireless network
257
was primarily the safety and convenience of its passengers.
In
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Supreme Court
held that the government has a compelling interest in preserving
258
public safety.
Because the “significant government interest”
standard is less stringent than the compelling interest standard,
BART’s public safety interest clearly meets this test.
The next inquiry is whether BART’s wireless network shutdown
was narrowly tailored to serve its significant government interest in
passenger safety. For content-neutral regulations, “[a] statute is
narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact
259
source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.”
“A complete ban can be
narrowly tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription’s
260
scope is an appropriately targeted evil.” For example, in Members of
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, the Supreme Court upheld a
regulation that proscribed all signs on public property because the
government had a significant interest in maintaining the aesthetic
261
nature of such property. As a result, the proscription was justified
because it only restricted the type of speech that it was designed to
262
prevent.
BART’s wireless network shutdown was a complete proscription
263
as it completely excluded all speech in the wireless network forum.
Thus, for BART to adequately justify its actions, the shutdown cannot
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

Id.
Id.
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
See supra Part II.C.1.
Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989).
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
Id.
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984).
Id.
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
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restrict more speech than it was designed to prevent. Once again,
BART’s motive for instituting the wireless network shutdown is
crucial to this analysis. BART’s reason for shutting down its wireless
network was to disrupt communication between flash mobbers once
265
they were on the train platforms. Specifically, BART attempted to
restrict speech relaying information regarding police locations and
response time as well as speech aimed at recruiting and bolstering
266
support for the flash mob.
The scope of BART’s restriction,
however, was far more expansive, as it censored any and all speech
within the wireless network forum. Thus, the wireless network
shutdown fails the narrowly tailored prong of the test because the
restriction limited considerably more expression than it was meant to
preclude.
In addition, BART’s restriction did not leave ample alternative
channels of communication open.
The constitutionality of a
regulation or restriction depends on whether it allows for alternate
267
avenues of communication.
In the instant case, BART’s wholesale
wireless shutdown completely prevented all avenues of
268
communication within the wireless network forum.
BART would
likely argue that it provided other avenues of communication,
including access to passenger courtesy phones, which are located in
269
the platform area.
These phones provide “direct communication
270
with Station Agents.” In addition, BART would likely assert that it
provided for two intercoms on each car, which allow passengers to
271
contact BART personnel for assistance while on trains.
Although
the courtesy phones and train intercoms constitute mediums for
communication, they are not suitable avenues for expressive
272
speech.
As a result, these substitutes are not an adequate
alternative to the wireless network, which provides access to an
everlasting dialogue committed to the free flow of ideas and
expression.
264

Id.
Id.
266
Id.
267
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802–03 (1989).
268
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
The courtesy phones and train intercoms are not suitable for expressive
speech because they are only used to communicate problems and concerns to BART
employees. Thus, these mediums do not reach a wide audience and are not
provided to bolster the spread of ideas.
265
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Ultimately, although BART’s wireless network shutdown served a
significant government interest (public safety), the complete
proscription on speech within the wireless network forum was not
narrowly tailored and did not provide for ample alternative means of
273
communication. As a result, the wireless network shutdown would
likely be ruled unconstitutional.
If a court refuses to extend traditional public forum status to
BART’s wireless network, it will probably be considered a nonpublic
forum. Although the wireless network enables public discourse and
allows for free expression, there is no evidence that BART
intentionally opened its wireless network for expressive speech.
Similar to American Library, where the Supreme Court found that a
public library’s Internet access was intended to facilitate information
gathering rather than free expression, BART provides wireless service
274
to its platform areas for passenger convenience and safety.
Thus,
comparable to American Library, a court would most likely rule that
BART’s wireless network is a nonpublic forum. Despite this, if BART
intended for its wireless network to ensure passenger safety, there is a
peculiar contradiction: BART both provided and shut down its
wireless network for safety purposes. Such a glaring inconsistency
may cut against the reasonableness of BART’s actions. Nonetheless, a
court would likely follow the same reasoning outlined in this
Comment in Part III.E.2, and hold that the wireless network
shutdown was a reasonable restriction on expression.
Nevertheless, wireless and social media networks should be
considered traditional public forums. If the Supreme Court decides
to adopt this view, speech within these forums will receive the utmost
protection under the First Amendment. Consequently, flash mob
protests will reap the benefits of such a designation.
IV. PRIOR RESTRAINTS ANALYSIS
Courts must also consider unconstitutional prior restraints on
speech when analyzing social media restrictions during flash mob
protests. The Supreme Court has defined a prior restraint as an
“administrative and judicial order forbidding certain communications
when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to
275
occur.”
Because prior restraints punish speech before the speech
273

See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
Id.; see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 206–07 (2003).
275
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993); see also Bradburn v. N.
Cent. Reg’l Library Dist., 231 P.3d 166, 173 (Wash. 2010) (defining a prior restraint
as a “restriction imposed on speech or another form of expression” before its
274
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has occurred, they are greatly disfavored by the courts, and are
276
In fact, in Nebraska Press
thereby presumptively unconstitutional.
Ass’n v. Stuart, the Supreme Court stated, “[t]he thread running
through all [prior restraint] cases is that prior restraints on speech
are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
277
Amendment rights.”
In addition, the temporary nature of a prior
restraint does not make the restraint any less offensive to the First
278
Amendment.
Before conducting a prior-restraints analysis, it is important to
understand the difference between a prior restraint and a subsequent
punishment. For example, in Alexander v. United States, the Supreme
Court ruled that a court-ordered forfeiture of funds was not a prior
restraint on speech because the order constituted a punishment for
279
the defendant’s past illegal acts. In response to this, the defendant
argued that the court order operated as a prior restraint because it
280
precluded his entry into the adult entertainment business.
The
Supreme Court dismissed this claim, holding that the order did not
prevent the defendant from using untainted assets to finance his
281
entry into the prospective field.
Thus, because the order merely
called for the seizure of the defendant’s tainted assets, it operated as
a subsequent punishment for the defendant’s past wrongful acts
282
rather than a prior restraint on his forthcoming speech.
Once it is determined that a speech restriction operates as a
occurrence. Prior restraints prevent future speech rather than punishing speech
that has already occurred).
276
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558–59 (1976); see also Bantum
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity.”). See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (finding
that the government did not adequately justify preemptively enjoining a new paper
publication of classified historical study on Vietnam policy); Martin H. Redish, The
Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53
(1984).
277
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562; see also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
368, 393 n.25 (1979) (holding that eliminating prior restraints is a “chief purpose” of
the First Amendment); Michael I. Meyerson, Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a
Complete Definition of Prior Restraint, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1097–98 (2001).
278
Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550; see also Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559 (ruling that
“the burden on the Government is not reduced by the temporary nature of a
restraint”).
279
Alexander, 509 U.S. at 551.
280
Id.
281
Id. (holding that the statute did not deprive the defendant from engaging in
expressive activities; the order only restricted which assets the defendant could use to
fund his entry into the adult entertainment industry).
282
Id.
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prior restraint, a court must determine whether the restraint is
283
Governments may justify a prior restraint by
justified.
demonstrating that the First Amendment does not protect the
284
restricted speech. To meet this exception, a flash mob protest must
fail to convey a message that is likely to be understood by the
285
286
audience. An example of such a flash mob is a flash robbery. If
the government fails to prove that the speech falls outside the
protections of the First Amendment, then the Supreme Court applies
the following three-prong test to determine whether the prior
restraint is justified: (1) the nature of the speech in question must be
likely to impair the rights of others; (2) there cannot be alternative
measures that may mitigate the anticipated harm associated with
allowing the speech; and (3) the prior restraint must be an effective
287
recourse to preventing the threatened danger. Although originally
tailored to address prior restraints on news publications, the court
can easily apply the test to flash mob protests.
The first prong of this test may be satisfied even if it is
speculative whether the rights of others will be impaired by the
288
speech.
But the conclusion that the rights of others may be
289
For example, in Nebraska Press, the
impaired must be reasonable.
Supreme Court ruled that it was reasonable for the judge to conclude
that “pervasive pretrial publicity” of an impending case may impair
290
the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Although such harm was
speculative, the Supreme Court held that the judge’s “conclusion as
to the impact of such publicity on prospective jurors was of necessity
speculative, dealing as he was with factors unknown and
291
unknowable.”
Therefore, the judge’s temporary injunction on
292
pretrial news coverage satisfied the first prong of the test.
The second prong of the test asks whether there were any
alternatives that could have mitigated the harm associated with the

283

Nebraska Press, 427 at 558 (holding that the government “carries a heavy
burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint”).
284
United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 310 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Nebraska
Press, 427 U.S. at 562).
285
See supra Part II.A.
286
Shayon, supra note 6.
287
Quattrone, 402 F.3d at 310–11 (citing Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562).
288
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562–63.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Id. at 563.
292
Id.
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293

particular speech. In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court found that
there were numerous viable alternatives to altogether enjoining
294
pretrial news coverage. Such alternatives included postponing the
trial, moving the trial to a less exposed venue, and clearly and
295
emphatically instructing the jurors of their duties.
The Supreme
Court ruled that the Government did not adequately refute these
alternatives because there was no finding that the alternatives “would
296
not have protected [the defendant’s] rights.”
This analysis
illustrates that the party seeking to enforce the prior restraint bears
the burden of disproving the efficacy of possible alternative
297
measures.
The last prong of the Nebraska Press test examines whether the
298
prior restraint will effectively prevent the threatened danger.
In
analyzing the third prong in Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court
examined the location of the trial, most notably the size of the
299
community. Due to the community’s small size, the Supreme Court
concluded that rumors and information concerning the defendant’s
trial likely would have permeated the town regardless of whether
300
there were any news accounts being printed or broadcast.
Thus,
because certain facts of the case would likely surface irrespective of
the pretrial news coverage, the restriction on news publication was
not an effective means of restraining a community from discussing
301
the facts of the trial. Ultimately, Nebraska Press embodies how much
courts disfavor anticipatory restraints on speech. As a result,
authorities that preemptively restrict flash mob protests will likely
have an extremely difficult time justifying their actions.
A. BART’s Wireless Network Shutdown Qualifies as an Unjustified
Prior Restraint
BART’s wireless network shutdown strongly resembles a prior
restraint because, on its face, the shutdown appears to restrict speech
302
“in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.”
293

Id.
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 563–65.
295
Id. at 563–64.
296
Id. at 565.
297
Id. at 562–63.
298
United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 311 (2d Cir. 2005).
299
Nebraksa Press, 427 U.S. at 567 (noting that the community had roughly 850
people in total).
300
Id.
301
Id.
302
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (internal quotations
294
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BART could argue that the wireless network shutdown is
comparable to Alexander, where the Supreme Court found no prior
restraint because the injunction did not restrict the defendant from
303
engaging in the expressive activity he desired. Rather, the Supreme
Court ruled that the order was a subsequent punishment that limited
the type of funds that the defendant could use to finance his entry
304
into the adult entertainment industry.
BART’s wireless network shutdown, however, is distinguishable
from Alexander. First, BART’s wireless network shutdown did not
constitute a subsequent punishment for the July 11 protest. There
was never an official finding that the July 11 protest required or
deserved reprisal. Although BART publically condemned the July 11
protest, no arrests were ever made regarding whether the protest
305
warranted punishment. In addition, the wireless network shutdown
does not fit the characteristics of a punishment. The shutdown was
grossly overbroad as it “punished” numerous people who fall outside
306
the class of alleged transgressors.
To illustrate, the shutdown
punished everyone on BART’s train platforms regardless of whether
307
they participated in the July 11 protest.
Secondly, BART’s alleged
punishment sought to reprimand an unidentifiable group of
individuals. Because BART did not possess a definitive list of people
who participated in the July 11 protest, it was impossible to direct a
punishment strictly toward flash mobbers. Moreover, the wireless
network shutdown was not an effective punishment because it did not
prevent or deter the type of behavior it sought to punish—the
308
endangerment of BART passengers.
Although a wireless network
shutdown can limit the effectiveness of perpetuating a flash mob
protest, it is arguably not meant to prevent a protest from occurring.
While the August 11 planned protest did not materialize, it is
unreasonable to believe the shutdown was the sole reason. As a
result, the wireless shutdown does not constitute a subsequent
punishment because (1) there was never a determination that the
July 11 protest warranted retribution, and (2) the shutdown does not
meet the criteria of a punishment.
In addition, BART could contend that the wireless shutdown was

omitted).
303
Id. at 550–51.
304
Id. at 551.
305
Ho, supra note 966.
306
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
307
Id.
308
Id.
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similar to Alexander in that it did not restrain the flash mobbers from
speaking out against BART; it merely restricted where they could
protest. This argument fails because the primary purpose of the
wireless network shutdown was to restrict flash mobbers’ access to
309
BART’s wireless network rather than the train platforms.
BART’s
letter to its passengers on August 20, 2011 is evidence of this purpose:
The August 10 intelligence revealed that the individuals
would be giving and receiving instructions to coordinate
their activities via cell phone after their arrival on the train
platforms at more than one station. Individuals were
instructed to text the location of police officers so that the
organizers would be aware of officer locations and response
times. The overall information about the planned protest
led BART to conclude that the planned action constituted a
serious and imminent threat to the safety of BART
310
passengers and personnel . . . .
As a result, BART fully expected the August 11 flash mob to take
place. Thus, the primary purpose for the wireless network shutdown
was to disrupt the communication of protestors once they were on
311
the platform, not to restrict the protestors’ access to the platform.
Consequently, this case is distinguishable from Alexander because
BART, motivated by speculative “intelligence,” attempted to restrict
speech that had not yet occurred by disabling its wireless network.
Since the wireless network shutdown constituted a prior restraint
and the August 11 flash mob protest qualifies as protected expressive
312
conduct, a court should apply the Nebraska Press three-pronged test.
The first prong of the Nebraska Press test asks whether the nature of
313
the speech in question is likely to impair the rights of others. BART
likely satisfies this prong as it is reasonable to believe that the August
11 protest would cause significant congestion on BART’s train
314
platforms.
Additionally, such congestion could lead to possible
315
safety problems.
Although this fear is speculative, the Supreme
Court has ruled that reasonable speculation does not defeat the first
316
prong of the Nebraska Press test.
309

Id.
Id.
311
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
312
United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 310–11 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)).
313
Id.
314
See Elinson, supra note 27.
315
Id.
316
See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 563.
310
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The second prong of the Nebraska Press test inquires as to
whether there are any other measures that may mitigate the harm
317
associated with allowing the speech.
As applied to the BART
situation, BART would have the burden of proving that there are no
318
less restrictive alternatives to ensuring passenger safety.
One
possible alternative to the wireless shutdown was to increase security
in the platform areas. In response to this, BART would likely assert
319
that it increased security by 120 extra uniformed officers. To carry
its burden, BART would have to demonstrate that an increase in
security alone was inadequate to protect its passengers and
320
personnel.
This is not easy to prove because it is reasonable to
believe that employing ample security would mitigate the detrimental
321
effects of protestors using social media to perpetuate the flash mob.
As a result, a wireless network shutdown would only marginally help
BART officers suppress the flash mob, making the tactic largely
unnecessary.
Though extreme, a second possible alternative would be to
temporarily restrict all passengers from the platform areas. A court
would likely hold that this tactic is unreasonable because the flash
mob was scheduled to occur during afternoon rush hour. Ultimately,
however, BART would encounter much difficulty in attempting to
carry its burden and would likely fail the second prong.
Furthermore, BART would also have trouble satisfying the third
prong of the Nebraska Press test, which questions “the probable
322
efficacy of a prior restraint” to prevent the threatened danger.
Shutting down wireless service is not an effective way of ensuring
public safety because it does not adequately safeguard against a flash
mob protest actually occurring. As a result, the safety of BART
passengers and personnel would be endangered notwithstanding the
wireless network shutdown. Although a court would now have the
benefit of hindsight and know that the August 11 planned protest did
not take place, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the wireless
network shutdown was the only reason for this. As mentioned above,
disabling wireless service was primarily intended to disrupt the
323
protestors’ communication during the protest.
This restriction in
317
318
319
320
321
322
323

Id. at 563–65.
Id. at 565.
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 565.
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 565.
See BART Letter, supra note 1077.
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no way affects the organization or planning of the flash mob. Thus, a
wireless network shutdown merely disturbs how effectively a protest is
carried out. As a result, irrespective of the wireless network
shutdown, BART’s train platforms were likely to be extremely
congested, thereby manifesting the danger BART sought to avoid.
BART would likely contend that the wireless network shutdown
mitigated these dangers by aiding security’s ability to suppress the
flash mob. Despite this, a wireless network shutdown does not
adequately “prevent the threatened danger” because passenger safety
is no less vulnerable as a result.
Ultimately, BART would most likely fail to carry its burden,
rendering the wireless network shutdown unconstitutional under the
Nebraska Press test. Therefore, the BART situation demonstrates that
governmental agencies that institute anticipatory restrictions on flash
mob protests, most notably restrictions on social media access, likely
will fail the Supreme Court’s rigorous prior restraint test.
V. CONCLUSION
324

To
Not all flash mobs receive First Amendment protections.
receive constitutional protection, a flash mob must attempt to express
325
a message that is likely to be understood by those who view it. As a
result, flash mobs such as flash robberies will not receive
constitutional protection because they do not convey a message.
Flash mob protests, on the other hand, almost always aim to convey a
message, and, thus, will generally be entitled to receive some First
326
Amendment protection.
Despite this, the government has more leeway in restricting
327
expressive conduct.
Therefore, in examining the constitutionality
of restrictions on flash mob protests, one must determine the flash
328
mob’s speech and “nonspeech” elements.
Once these are
determined, courts will examine whether the governmental
restriction on the flash mob is intended to regulate the protest’s
329
communicative elements.
In the event that the restriction is
intended to restrain the nonspeech elements of the flash mob, the
government’s interest in restraining those elements must outweigh
324

See supra Part.II.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)).
326
See supra Part.II.
327
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
328
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
329
Id.
325
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any incidental impingements on the speaker’s protected expressive
330
Ultimately, because the O’Brien test is extremely factmessage.
sensitive, there is no bright-line rule stating whether a restriction on a
331
flash mob protest violates the First Amendment.
Thus, flash mob
protests must be examined on a case-by-case basis.
Furthermore, because flash mob protests almost always attempt
332
to access wireless and social media networks, flash mob protests
should receive the protections of traditional public forums.
Although a court has yet to rule that wireless networks constitute
333
traditional public forums,
the BART situation embodies why
wireless and social media networks deserve the utmost protection
under the First Amendment. Thus, this Comment recommends that
334
courts downgrade the historical confines doctrine from a dispositive
standard to a merely persuasive factor. Ultimately, under this
proposed construction, limitations on a flash mob protests’ access to
social media networks should only be permissible in the most
extraordinary of circumstances.
Lastly, prior restraints on flash mob protests must rebut an
extremely heavy presumption of unconstitutionality, especially when
that restriction attempts to limit a flash mob protests’ access to social
335
media.
As a result, unless the prior restraint is associated with an
important governmental interest, a court would likely find that the
336
restriction is unconstitutional. Ultimately, if a flash mob protest is
entitled to First Amendment protection, its fundamental relationship
to social media will likely be its greatest defense against governmental
restrictions.

330

Id. at 377.
Id.
332
See Flash Mob Definition, supra note 1.
333
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (“The
Court has rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its
historical confines . . . .”).
334
Id.
335
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558–59 (1976).
336
Id.
331

